On October 30, 2024, United States District Court Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a plaintiff suing Sean Combs (a/k/a “P. Diddy”) cannot proceed under pseudonym in her lawsuit based on his alleged sexual assault of her. Jacob R. Goodman, an attorney at The Fierberg National Law Group who represents victims of sexual abuse, discusses this ruling below:
In determining whether a plaintiff can proceed under pseudonym, different courts apply different factors, but these factors largely seek to answer the same question: Does the risk of harm a plaintiff faces by her identity being revealed outweigh any harm to the defendant caused by pseudonymity and the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings?
Judge Vyskocil reasoned that, while the plaintiff’s allegations of sexual assault were “highly sensitive and of a personal nature,” the plaintiff failed to show a risk of harm to her should her name be revealed. In arguing that she faced a risk of harm should her name be revealed, the plaintiff’s counsel emphasized the physical harm that P. Diddy could cause her. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that P. Diddy had not contacted the plaintiff in twenty years since the alleged assault, which weighed against a finding that he would harm the plaintiff. The plaintiff also argued that she would “certainly experience” mental harm if forced to reveal her identity and that she would be “further victimized.” Judge Vyskocil also rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiff failed to “offer[] any evidence” of this future harm and that “public humiliation” or “generalized arguments” are not enough to establish such risk.
The plaintiff in this case also sought not to reveal her identity to anyone, even P. Diddy. The Court found this too weighed against pseudonymity because of prejudice to P. Diddy. It reasoned that P. Diddy is “entitled to investigate her background and challenge her allegations and her credibility” and that “[m]edia outlets have a constitutional right to publish stories about this case.” The Court also cited other problems with P. Diddy not knowing his accuser’s identity, including that he “cannot thoroughly investigate her allegations and her background and otherwise prepare a defense to her claim.” Lastly, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff could “seek less drastic remedies than blanket anonymity, such as redactions to protect particularly sensitive information or a protective order.”
Without a doubt, sexual abuse victims must reveal highly personal information and face a risk of future harm associated with coming forward as a sexual abuse victim. Such risk might deter a victim from seeking civil justice. This raises the question: how can future sexual abuse plaintiffs best argue that they should be allowed to proceed under pseudonyms?
First, sexual abuse victims face unique risks of harm should their identities be disclosed because of the social stigma connected to sexual abuse. Being identified as a victim of sexual abuse can negatively affect a victim’s academic, professional, and intrapersonal opportunities. However, supporting this risk of harm with specific evidence in seeking to proceed under pseudonym strengthens a plaintiff’s argument to do so. Perhaps a plaintiff is in a public-facing career, and, if her name is associated with being a victim of sexual abuse, individuals may first associate her with sexual abuse. Potential colleagues, classmates, or employers may judge a plaintiff based on her victim status rather than her professional qualifications. Additionally, a plaintiff could withdraw from activities, her social life, or professional opportunities due to the stigma she faces from victim blaming.
A plaintiff may also have colleagues or friends who know about the abuse she experienced but have grown distant due to the abuse accusations. Individuals other than the abuser who know about the abuse may have threatened the plaintiff. A plaintiff can also experience additional psychological, emotional, or physical harm from identity disclosure, such as anxiety associated with media coverage of personal details accompanied by physical symptoms or suicidal ideation. All such pieces of evidence provide stronger arguments that a plaintiff will face a risk of harm from her name being revealed rather than generalized arguments of harm.
Second, a plaintiff could seek less drastic remedies than blanket pseudonymity with even her identity being unknown to the defendant. Since prejudice toward the defendant is a factor that a court must consider, the defendant not knowing the identity of who is suing him can create prejudice against the defendant and weigh against pseudonymity. As the court in the P. Diddy case pointed out, a defendant is entitled to conduct discovery to challenge the accusations against him. This cannot be done effectively, if at all, if the defendant does not know who made the allegations against him. Name redactions and a protective order may allow a plaintiff’s identity to be known to the defendant while remaining unknown to the public. This minimizes prejudice against the defendant while protecting the plaintiff from the harm associated with being publicly revealed as a victim of sexual abuse.
